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INTRODUCTION  
 
Between 2000 and 2007, the rate of imprisonment in the United 
States increased more rapidly than the general population.1 Amidst this 
rapid increase in the rate of incarceration, states have been experiencing 
budget deficits, which “are expected to continue, and possibly increase 
in the coming years.”2 States will have to find measures that control 
corrections costs as budget deficits continue to increase.3 While seeking 
a solution to the faltering economy and the increasing rate of 
incarceration, “some elected officials are embracing a new idea: making 
inmates pay their debt to society not only in hard time, but also in cold, 
hard cash.”4 Pay-to-stay programs charge inmates for the cost of their 
incarceration and have been implemented in various forms to combat 
decreasing corrections budgets and high incarceration rates. New 
York’s proposed “Madoff Bill” and New Jersey’s similar bill, if used in 
conjunction with other measures that seek to decrease the rate of 
incarceration, may provide a financial solution for their respective 
states, because the bills would defray the high costs of incarceration, 
while promoting personal responsibility where an individual has 
sufficient means. Several other states have implemented similar 
programs over the past two decades that charge inmates for the cost of 
their incarceration through different methods. 
 
1 HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2007 1 (2009), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. 
2 CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN 
CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-2009.pdf. 
3 Id.  
4 N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners, 
FOXNEWS.COM(Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/05/ny-lawmaker-
introduces-madoff-aims-charge-wealthy-prisoners/.  
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This Note examines the potential efficacy of the proposed pay-to-
stay legislation in New York and New Jersey and concludes that while 
the legislation would not serve as a panacea for current problems, it has 
the potential to provide a significant amount of funds to both states. Part 
I describes the problem of high rates of incarceration and the associated 
costs. Part II surveys the current legislation of several states and details 
popular provisions of pay-to-stay legislation. Part III addresses the 
effectiveness and criticisms of pay-to-stay programs. Part IV then 
explains the pertinent provisions of the proposed legislation in New 
York and New Jersey. Part V identifies alternative measures available to 
states for addressing both high incarceration rates and decreasing 
budgets. Part VI analyzes the proposed legislation and looks at the 
potential efficacy of both bills. Finally, this Note concludes that New 
York’s Madoff Bill and New Jersey’s S. 579 should be adopted, as they 
have the potential to provide a significant source of funding to both 
states. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Incarceration Rates 
The incarceration rate in the United States is staggering in 
comparison to other industrialized nations; incarceration per capita in 
the United States is “three times more than Israel, five times more than 
England, six times more than Australia and Canada, eight times more 
than France, and over twelve times more than Japan.”5 In 2008, for the 
first time in history, 2.3 million people, or one in every 100 adults in the 
United States, were incarcerated.6 Excluding those incarcerated in jails, 
the number of United States residents serving sentences in federal or 
state prison accounted for one in every 198 residents as of December 
31, 2007.7 Between 2000 and 2007, the rate of imprisonment in the 
United States increased more rapidly than the general population; the 
number of prisoners increased by 15%, with the general population 
 
5 Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment 
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 52 (2008). 
6 John Gramlich, Study Finds Disparity in Corrections Spending, STATELINE.ORG (Mar. 
2, 2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=380542.   
7 WEST & SABOL, supra note 1, at 3. “As of December 31, 2007, there were 506 
sentenced prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents (1 in every 198 U.S. residents) up from 501 
per 100,000 at yearend 2006.” Id.  
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increasing only 6.4% during the same time period.8 Despite the overall 
trend between 2000 and 2007, New York experienced a decrease of 
sixty-two prisoners per 100,000 residents, and New Jersey experienced 
a similar decrease of fifty-four prisoners per 100,000 residents.9 
The increase in the number of incarcerated individuals has led to 
overcrowding in many prisons and jails. The 2000 Census of State and 
Correctional Facilities conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
concluded that while federal prisons were rated to hold approximately 
83,000 individuals, they were holding nearly 111,000 prisoners.10 On 
average, state prison facilities were also found to be operating in excess 
of capacity.11 Citing these statistics, one author noted that “[t]his is to 
say nothing of the over-crowding in hundreds of the nation’s jails that 
are not analyzed in the Bureau of Justice Statistics.”12 As prisoners 
challenge overcrowding through the legal system, the state experiences 
increased costs in defending itself against these suits.13 Prison 
overcrowding is also linked to other problems with confinement, such 
as “unsanitary facilities, inadequate staffing, poor medical care, 
heightened levels of tension and violence, and a higher incidence of 
sexual assault.”14 
B. Costs of Incarceration 
In the 2008 fiscal year, total corrections expenditures of states 
reached nearly $52 billion.15 States spent approximately $47 billion of 
general funds, $4 billion of special funds and bonds, and $900 million 
of federal funds on corrections.16 Since 1998, the $47 billion expenditure 
of general funds represents a massive 303% increase in spending.17 Total 
 
8 Id. at 1.  
9 Id. at 5. “[I]ndividuals under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional 
authorities.” HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008 – STATISTICAL TABLES 21 (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf.  
10 Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 9-10.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 10. 
13 Id. at 20. 
14 Id.  
15 SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
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corrections expenditures rank as the fifth largest area of state spending 
behind “Medicaid, secondary education, higher education and 
transportation.”18 The past few years alone have seen a large increase in 
corrections expenditures by states; in 2005, state governments made 
direct expenditures of more than $31 billion on institutions.19 
The cost of housing an individual inmate varies greatly among 
states and regions of the country. In fiscal year 2005, Rhode Island’s 
average per inmate cost of incarceration of $44,860 was the highest in 
the country, while Louisiana had the lowest average per inmate cost of 
incarceration of $13,009.20 Northeastern states had an average per 
inmate cost of incarceration of $35,584, while southern states had an 
average of only $17,991 in 2005.21 Currently, the cost of incarceration 
per inmate in New Jersey is over $38,700 per year.22 New York’s 
current average per inmate cost of incarceration is in excess of $40,000 
per year.23 
 At least twenty-six states have responded to the national 
recession by cutting their prison budgets, which was one of the fastest-
growing areas of government spending, for fiscal year 2010.24 These 
states have made budget cuts despite the fact that the “state corrections 
budgets have ballooned in the past two decades amid a surging U.S. 
prison population.”25 While many states made smaller cuts in the 
corrections budgets, seven states cut corrections funding by more than 
ten percent.26 Kansas made the largest reported budget cut with a 22% 
 
18 John Gramlich, At Least 26 States Spend Less on Prisons, STATELINE.ORG (Aug. 11, 
2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=418338.  
19 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t 
192005.pdf.  
20 John Gramlich, Strapped States Eye Prison Savings, STATELINE.ORG (Jan. 26, 2009), 
http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=365279. 
21 Id.  
22 S. 579, 2010 Sess., 214th Leg.(N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF.  
23 Gramlich, supra note 20. 
24 Thirty-seven states responded to this survey. Gramlich, supra note 18. “The survey 
did not take into account federal stimulus money, which allowed some states to blunt the 
impact of their budget cuts.” Id. 
25 Id.  
26
 “Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, and Washington – cut funding 
for corrections by more than 10 percent from last year’s levels according to the study.” Id. 
ANDOLENA 12/6/2010  11:58 AM 
2010 PAY-TO-STAY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS 99 
 
decrease in state funding to corrections.27 The Vera Institute of Justice 
stated that “[w]ith one in every 15 state general fund dollars now spent 
on corrections, officials have little choice but to look there for savings. 
In doing so, however, they must be careful to find cuts that will not 
compromise public safety.”28 
C. Charging Inmates for the Cost of their Incarceration 
The practice of charging inmates for the cost of their incarceration 
began when Michigan adopted its State Correctional Facility 
Reimbursement Act.29 Statutes requiring reimbursement to the state or 
county paying the cost of imprisonment are often referred to as pay-to-
stay programs. In 1983, interviews with prison officials in forty-four 
states revealed that the vast majority of states had exceeded their 
housing capacities and many others had difficulty remaining below their 
inmate capacity.30 At this time, Michigan was facing serious 
overcrowding issues.31 The Michigan Corrections Commissioner asked 
Governor James J. Blanchard to declare an emergency, in accordance 
with the State’s Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act.32 That act 
mandates the declaration of an emergency whenever the prison 
population is in excess of a predetermined number for longer than thirty 
consecutive days.33 It was in this context that Michigan adopted the 
State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act. Since 1984, at least 
twenty-four states have adopted similar programs as a means of 
recouping a portion of the funds expended on incarcerating those 
convicted of crimes. These programs are popular amongst taxpayers, as 
they reflect the belief that “[i]nmates should be made to pay for their 
crimes – literally.”34 These statutes are seen as “symbolic” and address 
both the accountability and fiscal issues of incarceration.35 
 
27 Id. 
28 SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 3. 
29 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.401 (LexisNexis 2009).  
30 Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, State Prisons Around Nation Scramble for Relief 
as Overcrowding Mounts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1983, at A18.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 State Prisons Go After New Source of Financing: Their Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
1996, at 14. 
35 Id.  
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II. LEGISLATION 
A. State Statutes 
At least twenty-four states have a statute allowing for the recovery 
of the costs of incarceration from inmates.36 While some statutes provide 
for detailed procedures as to the assessment and collection of the costs 
of incarceration,37 others merely authorize the practice.38 Further, some 
statutes permit state recovery,39 while others provide for recovery by 
counties.40 Still others provide for recovery by both states and counties. 
Despite these differences, there are several provisions that are common 
to many. 
The pay-to-stay statutes can be grouped into two categories: those 
that provide the state with a cause of action against the inmate,41 and 
those that permit a fee to be assessed against an inmate without a 
 
36 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238 (LexisNexis 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-506 
(2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485 (LexisNexis 2009); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/20 (LexisNexis 2009); 
IOWA CODE § 356.7 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §15:705 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2009); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS SERV. § 800.401 (LexisNexis 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831 (2009); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 53-1-107 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.2415 (LexisNexis 2009); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-B:19 (LexisNexis 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.56 (LexisNexis 
2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151 (2007); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.019 (West 2009); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-201 (LexisNexis 2009); W. VA. CODE § 25-1-3a (2009); WIS. STAT. § 301.325 
(2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-109 (2009).  
37 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-506; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 125/20; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831. 
38 Kentucky allows the amount to be deducted from the inmate’s canteen account. KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265. Louisiana requires approval by the sentencing judge. LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §15:705. 
39 Those states providing for state recovery include: Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, 
Missouri, Texas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238; CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 18-85a; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.401; MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831; TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 41-21-905; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.019; WIS. STAT. § 301.325.  
40 Those states providing for county recovery include: Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, 
and Wyoming. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341; MICH. 
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 801.88; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.2415; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-
109.  
41 Those statutes providing a cause of action against the inmate include: ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 12-29-506 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
125/20 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 217.831 (2009).  
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judicial proceeding.42 In states where the statute provides a cause of 
action, the Attorney General is authorized to initiate civil proceedings, 
if certain requirements are met, to recover the costs of incarceration 
from the inmate or former inmate.43 Other statutes do not require a 
judicial proceeding, however, the statutes may authorize the fee to be 
deducted from the inmate’s canteen account,44 or may require approval 
by the sentencing judge in order to seek reimbursement from the 
inmate.45 A few states provide for both practices by authorizing the 
deduction of costs from the assets in the possession of the correction 
official or government authority, and by then permitting the institution 
of a civil action if the funds available are insufficient to cover the entire 
cost of incarceration.46 Some statutes specify what will be done with the 
funds received as reimbursement for incarceration costs, with most 
dictating that the funds go to the corrections department or facility 
budget.47 
Where a recovery is not automatically permitted, many statutes 
impose a time limit within which the Attorney General or the county 
may bring the action to recover.48 For example, Connecticut’s statute 
permits the Attorney General to bring a claim within two years of the 
inmate’s release.49 Idaho imposes a one-year limitation for the county to 
 
42 Those statutes permitting a fee to be assessed without a judicial proceeding include: 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:705 (2009).  
43 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-506; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 125/20; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831.  
44 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265.   
45 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:705.  
46 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.56 (LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 979a 
(2009).   
47 Seventy percent of money recovered goes to the state general fund and 30% goes to 
the Attorney General’s costs. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238 (LexisNexis 2008). 
Reimbursements are credited to the justice fund or current expense fund of the county, to be 
available for jail maintenance and operation purposes. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009). 
Money recovered goes to the jail’s budget. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265. Twenty percent 
is paid to a recovered inmate incarceration reimbursement act revolving fund, and the 
remaining money goes to the department for the construction and operation of the 
correctional facility. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.841. “[C]redit the moneys to the appropriate 
fund established by law from which appropriations to the department are made for inmate 
care and custody at the department.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-507.  
48 Those statutes explicitly implementing a time limit for recovery include: CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 18-85a; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265.    
49 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008).  
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file a claim against the former inmate for reimbursement.50 
Many of the statutes provide for an assessment of the inmate or 
former inmate’s ability to pay the cost of their incarceration.51 Florida 
assesses the inmate’s ability to pay all or a portion of the cost of his or 
her incarceration, and looks to the obligations of the individual to the 
victim and the needs of the inmate’s dependents.52 Under the Idaho 
statute, the county investigates the financial status of the inmate by 
looking at the “age, marital status, number and ages of children and 
other dependents, type and value of real estate, personal property, 
investments, cash, bank accounts, pensions, annuities, salary, wages, 
other personal property.”53 Many statutes exclude jointly owned 
property or assets.54 Other statutes mandate that “the fee must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the offender’s ability to pay.”55 The 
determination that an inmate has the ability to pay a certain portion is a 
prerequisite to seeking recovery under certain statutes.56 At least three 
states require that the Attorney General have “good cause to believe that 
a prisoner has sufficient assets to recover not less than 10% of the 
estimated cost of care of the prisoner or 10% of the estimated cost of 
care for two years, whichever is less.”57 
Some statutes specify a maximum permitted recovery, while others 
specify a method or formula for determining the amount to be assessed 
against the inmate.58 Several statutes provide for the amount for each 
day that may be charged as the lesser of the amount specified in the 
statute and the actual cost of incarceration.59 In Maine, the fee assessed 
 
50 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607.  
51 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485(LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 
(2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 
217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-109 
(2009).  
52 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485.  
53 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009). 
54 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.045.  
55 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.045.   
56
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2). See also MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831; 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905. 
57 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009). See also MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009).  
58 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151 (2007). 
59 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265; ME. REV. 
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by the sentencing court “may not exceed the cost of incarcerating the 
offender or $80 per day, whichever is less.”60 Rather than specify a per 
diem rate, many statutes require the determination of the per annum cost 
by the department of corrections or commissioner of corrections, and 
then prorate this amount for those individuals who are incarcerated less 
than 334 days.61 Some statutes also permit recovery from inmates for the 
cost of incarceration during the time served prior to conviction.62 States 
may also allow for the cost of incarceration to be offset by any claim or 
obligation that the inmate has against the state.63 
Finally, some statutes impose consequences for failing to comply 
with the statute’s terms.64 For example, the Idaho statute does not allow 
for an inmate’s term to be reduced if they have “willfully [refused]” to 
provide information regarding their assets.65 Also, Florida requires that 
inmates disclose their assets as a condition of parole.66 Perhaps the most 
extreme statute is that of Maine, which provides that the offender must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to pay was not 
the result of an “intentional or knowing refusal to obey the court’s order 
or. . .a failure on the offender’s part to make a good-faith effort to 
obtain the funds required to make payment.”67 Maine permits the court 
to place an offender under custody, if seeking reimbursement once the 
individual has been released, “until all or a specified part of the jail 
reimbursement fee is paid,” but the length of confinement “may not 
exceed one day for every $5 of unpaid jail reimbursement fee or 6 
months, whichever is shorter.”68 
 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 134; OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151.  
60 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341. See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265; OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151.  
61 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238.  
62 See, e.g., id.   
63 Id.  
64 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2009).  
65 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009).  
66 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485 (LexisNexis 2009).  
67 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341.  
68 Id.  
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B. Litigation Regarding the Statutes 
1. Due Process Challenge 
Missouri has one of the most comprehensive pay-to-stay statutes, 
containing several provisions that have been included in the New York 
and New Jersey bills.69 The Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act 
has withstood due process challenges. Missouri v. Peterson70 
demonstrates the constitutionality of a cost-effective statutory provision, 
and how this provision functions to prevent the state from seeking 
reimbursement where such actions would be futile and a waste of state 
resources.
71
 Petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery in 1995, 
and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.72 He worked in the 
craft room and sold his projects, and received a state payroll deposit 
each month.73 
In May 2006, the Attorney General filed a petition for 
reimbursement under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, 
which stated that the Attorney General had good cause to believe that 
the state could recover at least the threshold amount, ten percent of the 
cost of Petitioner’s care for two years.74 The parties agreed that ten 
percent of the Petitioner’s cost of care for two years was $2800.75 
Petitioner argued that the statutory definition of assets was 
unconstitutionally vague, and that because the court seized his assets 
without a hearing, the act violated his due process rights.76 He also 
challenged the Attorney General’s finding of good cause under section 
217.831.3, asserting that the Attorney General did not have the authority 
to file the petition for reimbursement.77 Examining the language of the 
statute,78 the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the use of the words 
 
69 MO. REV. STAT. § 217.827 (2009).  
70 Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77 (Mo. 2008). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 80.   
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 80 n.3.  
76 Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Mo. 2008). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 81. Section 217.827 states that for the Missouri Incarceration 
Reimbursement Act, the term asset shall mean:  
 
   (1) (a) ”Assets”, property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to 
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“wages” and “bonuses” implied “a regular employment relationship.”79 
The Court also found that the state payroll monthly deposits were the 
only funds that qualified as a wage or bonus, and were properly 
excluded from the Attorney General’s assessment of Petitioner’s 
assets.80 
In response to Petitioner’s due process claim, the Court noted that 
before a pre-judgment seizure, the Attorney General must have good 
 
or due an offender or a former offender, including income or payments to such 
offender from Social Security, workers’ compensation, veterans’ compensation, 
pension benefits, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities, 
retirement benefits, or from any other source whatsoever, including any of the 
following: 
         a. Money or other tangible assets received by the offender as a result of a 
settlement of a claim against the state, any agency thereof, or any claim against 
an employee or independent contractor arising from and in the scope of said 
employee’s or contractor’s official duties on behalf of the state or any agency 
thereof; 
         b. A money judgment received by the offender from the state as a result of 
a civil action in which the state, an agency thereof or any state employee or 
independent contractor where such judgment arose from a claim arising from 
the conduct of official duties on behalf of the state by said employee or 
subcontractor or for any agency of the state; 
         c. A current stream of income from any source whatsoever, including a 
salary, wages, disability, retirement, pension, insurance or annuity benefits or 
similar payments;  
      (b) ”Assets” shall not include: 
         a. The homestead of the offender up to fifty thousand dollars in value; 
         b. Money saved by the offender from wages and bonuses up to two 
thousand five hundred dollars paid the offender while he or she was confined to 
a state correctional center. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.827 (2009).   
79 Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 81. In determining what is considered an asset some states 
have determined that the state may access gifts and windfalls of inmates or former inmates 
in seeking reimbursement for the costs of incarceration. According to the press secretary for 
the Attorney General in Missouri, “[g]ifts are considered assets under the statute. In many 
cases, inmates received thousands of dollars in deposits, which are put into their inmate 
accounts each year… Some inmates have large assets, such as retirement funds, trust funds, 
annuity payments, inheritances and lottery winnings.” Trish Mehaffey, Attorneys Battle Law 
Requiring Prisoners to Pay for Their Stay, DAILY RECORD (Kansas City, Mo.), July 9, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 26684687. Also, in Connecticut, “[t]he state Department of 
Administrative Services has collected incarceration costs from current and former inmates 
who come into what the state considers a ‘windfall’ – money received through an 
inheritance, the lottery, or a legal judgment – since 2001.” Ann Marie Somma, Windfalls 
Not Much Luck for Prisoners; States Will Send a Bill to Cover its Expenses, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Apr. 15, 2007, at A1. 
80 Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 81-82. Section 217.827(1)(b) excludes from assets “[m]oney 
saved by the offender from wages and bonuses up to two thousand five hundred dollars paid 
the offender while he or she was confined to a state correctional facility.” Id. at 80.  
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cause to believe that the offender has sufficient assets,81 and that the 
court is then required to issue an order to show cause regarding why the 
petition should not be granted to the Attorney General.82 This process 
provides the offender with notice and the opportunity to challenge the 
petition.83 The Court stated that “the fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner,’”84 and found that the statutory procedures provided 
adequate due process to offenders.85 Finally, in response to the argument 
that the Attorney General did not have the authority to file the petition, 
the Court noted that the “good cause to believe” requirement is a 
condition precedent that must be met in order for the Attorney General 
to have the authority to seek reimbursement.86 The Court noted that the 
good cause requirement is not intended as a defense to a petition for 
offenders, but rather is “intended as a cost-effective limitation on the 
attorney general’s authority.”87 An offender is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether there is good cause if the offender is able 
to raise a factual issue regarding the presence of the requisite assets.88 
III. PAY-TO-STAY PROGRAMS 
A. Effectiveness of Current Programs 
Many states and counties have recovered large sums of money 
from inmates as reimbursement for the costs of their incarceration.89 For 
example, under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, the 
 
81 Id. at 82 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 217.837.2).  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. (quoting Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Mo. 2007) (en 
banc)). 
85 Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Mo. 2008).   
86 Id. (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Watson, 204 S.W.3d 716, 720  (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); 
State ex rel. Nixon v. Koonce, 173 S.W.3d 277, 283-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)). 
87 Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 720; Koonce, 173 S.W.3d 
at 283-85). 
88 Id. at 83-84.  
89 Missouri collected more than $5.3 million between 1993 and 2007. Mehaffey, supra 
note 79. Connecticut collected $5 million between 2001 and April 2007. Somma, supra note 
79. Macomb County, Michigan recovered nearly $1.5 million in 2003 alone. Fox 
Butterfield, Many Local Officials Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2004, at A1. 
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State collected more than $5.3 million between 1993 and 2007.90 In 
2006 alone, the Missouri Attorney General’s office collected $757,862 
from state inmates as reimbursement to the state for the cost of their 
incarceration.91 
Under Michigan’s Prisoner Reimbursement to the County Act, 
Macomb County, Michigan, which charges inmates for room and board 
“on a sliding scale of $8 to $56 a day, depending on ability to pay,” 
collected nearly $1.5 million in 2003 alone.92 In addition, Hillsborough 
County, Florida recently adopted a daily subsistence fee of $5 per day 
and has added a charge of $50 per day for those inmates who have been 
convicted of a crime and are serving time in jail.93 Police Commissioner 
Kevin Beckner believes that these new measures could raise as much as 
$5.6 million assuming a collection rate of 80%.94 Further, Connecticut, 
which collects its reimbursement fees from inmates’ windfalls, collected 
$5 million between 2001 and April 2007, with the Connecticut 
Department of Administrative Services collecting $1.9 million in 2006 
alone.95 
Despite administrative costs,96 pay-to-stay programs collect a 
significant amount of money for the states and counties that implement 
them. Although the money that such programs bring in may be small in 
comparison to a jail or prison’s annual operating cost, the programs are 
also popular with the public.97 Sheriff Mark Hackel of Macomb County, 
Michigan said “[w]hy should we as taxpayers have to pay the whole 
 
90 Mehaffey, supra note 79. Missouri Department of Corrections reported an estimated 
inmate cost per year of $14,000. Id.  
91 Nixon Gets $757,862 From State Inmates, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Dec. 20, 
2006, at 1B. Under the Missouri statute, the Attorney General has a cause of action to obtain 
a judgment against the offender for the cost of their incarceration if they have good cause to 
believe the recovery will be above certain threshold levels. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831 
(2009). 
92 Butterfield, supra note 89. 
93 Bill Varin, Jail Inmates May Pay More For Stay, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2009, at 5B.  
94 Id. Due to the fact that the $50 daily fee could cost some inmates approximately 
$18,000, as many jail inmates are serving sentences of just under one year for 
misdemeanors. Id.  
95 Somma, supra note 79.  
96 Butterfield, supra note 89. The Macomb County, Michigan program costs $120,000 
per year to administer. Id. 
97 Id.  
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cost of incarcerating these people who break the law?”98 The 
Jacksonville Sheriff, John Rutherford, expressed a similar sentiment, 
stating that although the money collected will “only put a dent” in his 
budget, “the general public will appreciate the fact [that] inmates will be 
made to pay some of their own way.”99 
B. Criticism of Pay-to-Stay Statutes 
Many opponents of pay-to-stay statutes criticize the laws as 
ineffective because the inmates from whom reimbursement is sought are 
often poor.100 The ACLU’s National Prison Project has criticized pay-to-
stay statutes as ineffective.101 The National Prison Project believes that 
since “[t]he overwhelming number of people who end up in prison are 
poor,” pay-to-stay programs rarely are profitable.102 
Another criticism of pay-to-stay statutes is that the funds sought 
are difficult to collect.103 In Overland Park, Kansas, officials only collect 
 
98 Id.  
99 Tia Mitchell, Sheriff: Make the Inmates Pay More; Rutherford Suggests a $2 
Subsistence Fee for Incarceration Costs, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, May 27, 2008, at A1.  
100 See Butterfield, supra note 89. Stating that: 
[T]he fees raise thorny ethical and constitutional issues, say advocates for 
prisoners rights and some other corrections experts. The costs place an unfair 
burden on a population that is almost by definition impoverished, making it 
harder for inmates to get back on their feet after release, some groups argue. 
Others contend that the fees deprive inmates of due process or constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment. In a few cases, courts have sided with the inmates of 
specific issues.  
Id. Due to rising “clearance rates (‘the fraction of crimes cleared by arrest’)” and sentencing 
practices during the 1980s and 1990s, “about one and a half million more people were 
locked up in 2000 than in 1980. Such individuals are poor by any standard. Furthermore, 
their income – for the most part no more than a few dollars a day—place them very far 
fellow the poverty line.” Ian Irvine & Kuan Xu, Crime, Punishment, and the Measurement 
of Poverty in the United States, 1979-1997 2 (Dalhousie University Economics Working 
Paper, June 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=423220.   
101 N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/05/ny-
lawmaker-introduces-madoff-aims-charge-wealthy-prisoners/.  
102 Id. (quoting Elizabeth Alexander, ACLU’s National Prison Project director).  
103 See Butterfield, supra note 89. Stating that:  
[C]ollecting fees is also an entirely different matter from levying them. Some 
places profess so much difficulty that they have concluded the administrative 
costs outweigh the benefits. Even if the programs bring in revenue, there may 
be other costs. “The simple, stark truth is that most inmates are not drug 
kingpins with lots of assets,” said Richard Blumenthal, the Connecticut attorney 
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39% of the fees that they are owed.104 Officials in Jackson County, 
Missouri, found that they were expending more money in their efforts to 
collect the fees than they were able to collect.105 Further, where counties 
merely attempt to collect their fees by taking money from inmates’ 
commissary funds, inmates are able to avoid being charged for the cost 
of their incarceration by not depositing any money into their accounts.106 
Critics also accuse pay-to-stay programs of placing the burden on 
the wrong people.107 Oftentimes, friends and family members of inmates 
are left holding the bill in addition to, or in lieu of, the inmates 
themselves.108 These programs “[place] an additional financial burden 
upon families already deprived of a wage-earner, especially where these 
family members, as taxpayers, are already subsidizing the cost of 
incarceration.”109 This criticism likely resonates best in states or counties 
that collect fees from the inmate’s prison or jail account because it is the 
families of inmates that often make deposits into these accounts.110 
Still other opponents of pay-to-stay statutes argue that the 
programs are not rehabilitative.111 Since the programs may potentially 
burden a recently released inmate with a significant amount of debt, 
such inmates may feel pressure to resort to criminal activity in order to 
 
general. “In some cases, seizing assets may be counterproductive because it will 
interfere with their rehabilitation.” 
    Id.  
104 N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners, supra 
note 101.  
105 Id.   
106 See Butterfield, supra note 89. According to one person, who was sentenced to jail 
for thirty days, “I don’t put any money into my account, because they will just take it. . . I 
think this system is unjust, because the judge has already given us our sentence, and the fees 
are on top of that.” Id.   
107 Particularly in states where fees are periodically collected from an inmate’s prison 
account, the burden of these statutes falls on the wrong parties, as “[i]t’s the spouses, 
children and parents who pay the fees. They are the people who contribute to the prisoners’ 
canteen accounts.” N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy 
Prisoners, supra note 101. 
108 Id.  
109 Joshua Michtom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay for Their Stay: How a Popular 
Correctional Program Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 187, 201 
(2004).  
110 N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners, supra 
note 101  
111 See Michtom, supra note 109, at 201.   
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relieve themselves of the burden.112 According to Richard Blumenthal, 
the Connecticut Attorney General, “[t]he simple, stark truth is that most 
inmates are not drug kingpins with lots of assets. . . In some cases, 
seizing assets may be counterproductive because it will interfere with 
their rehabilitation.”113 
IV. PENDING LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY 
A. New York’s Madoff Bill 
Sponsored by New York State Assemblyman Jim Tedesco on June 
23, 2009,114 New York’s Madoff Bill would require inmates with 
sufficient financial means to pay for the costs of their incarceration.115 
Proposed Section 601-e would be entitled “Reimbursement for Costs of 
Imprisonment,” and proposed Subdivision 1 explains that the expense 
of imprisonment is to be borne by the inmates.116 Under the bill, each 
inmate is subject to reimburse the state a specified portion of the cost of 
his incarceration.117 This schedule looks to the inmate’s total assets to 
determine his liability to the state’s Department of Corrections, and 
creates a sliding scale dictating that an inmate owes a higher percentage 
of the cost of his or her incarceration the higher the amount of their total 
assets.118 Under the proposed schedule, an inmate who has total assets of 
$200,000 or more would be responsible for 100% of the cost of his or 
her incarceration, and an inmate who has total assets of less than 
$40,000 would not be responsible for any of the cost.119 
The bill excludes from an inmate’s “total assets” the value of his or 
her home or equity therein.120 Child support and mortgage payments are 
also protected from consideration.121 
 
112 Id.  
113 Butterfield, supra note 89.  
114 Assemb. 09055, 232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A09055%09%09&Memo=Y. 
115 N.Y. Assemb. 09055.   




120 Id.  
121 M.J. Stephey, Making Prisoners Pay – Literally, TIME, July 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1912065,00.html. 
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The purpose of the legislation is to: 
. . .[E]liminate situations where taxpayers are forced to pay costs 
associated with incarcerating well-off criminals. Taxpayers should 
not be stuck with the bill housing well-off criminals that are often are 
able to return to their opulent lifestyles once they are released. 
Forcing wealthy criminals to pay the costs associated with their 
incarceration will act as a deterrent and will prevent the 
inappropriate use of taxpayer funds in our prisons. . . This bill will 
hold criminals accountable for their actions while taking the fiscal 
burden off our taxpayers.122 
In the justification for the bill, Assemblyman Tedisco explained 
that the “recent incident” in Tombs prison, where the prison was “used 
as a social club for parties hosted by wealthy inmates and their 
connected friends,” demonstrates the necessity for this legislation.123 The 
justification states that the proposed legislation would “hold criminals 
accountable for their actions while taking the fiscal burden off our 
taxpayers.”124 In addition to the Tombs Prison bar mitzvah being an 
impetus for the bill, Assemblyman Tedisco said that he has “been 
considering the bill for a long time, [and] called convicted Ponzi 
schemer Bernard Madoff’s 150-year sentence in federal prison the 
‘tipping point.’”125 Wealthy drug dealers are an additional target of the 
 
122 Assemb. 09055, 232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A09055%09%09&Memo=Y.  
123 Id. In December 2008, at Tombs Jail in Downtown Manhattan, Tuvia Stern, an 
inmate in the detention center, hosted an extravagant, 60-person Bar Mitzvah celebration for 
his son. Stern, who was convicted of fraud, hosted the celebration from prison, “featuring a 
Kosher caterer on china plates and a live band.” New York Assemblyman Proposes ‘Madoff 
Bill’ to Punish Wealthy Inmates, FOXNEWS.COM (July 21, 2009) (on file with author). 
Tombs houses approximately 20,000 inmates each year and “is the largest receiving area in 
the country,” with “[m]ore than 500 corrections officers supervise some 850 inmates.” 
Harriet Ryan, History Haunts Manhattan’s Tombs Jail, CNN.COM (Dec. 31, 2002), 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/31/ctv.tombs/. 
124 N.Y. Assemb. 09055.  
125 New York Assemblyman Proposes ‘Madoff Bill’ to Punish Wealthy Inmates, supra 
note 123.  
A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported 
returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi 
scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in 
opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many 
Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on attracting new money to make promised 
payments to earlier-stage investors and to use for personal expenses, instead of 
engaging in any legitimate investment activity.   
Ponzi Schemes – Frequently Asked Questions, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
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proposed legislation.126 
B. New Jersey Bill 
On May 7, 2009, State Senator James Beach (Camden) introduced 
NJ Legislative Bill S. 2809 that requires “certain inmates to pay the cost 
of their incarceration.” 127 On May 18, 2009, Assemblywoman Dawn 
Marie Addiego (Burlington) and Assemblyman Scott Rudder 
(Burlington) introduced an identical bill, NJ Legislative Bill A3964, in 
the State Assembly.128 Then on January 12, 2010, Assemblywoman 
Addiego and Assemblyman Rudder introduced the exact same bill in 
the State Assembly, NJ Legislative Bill A1180.129On the same day, State 
Senator Beach introduced an identical bill in the State Senate, NJ 
Legislative Bill S. 579.130 
Under the proposed legislation, the Commissioner of Corrections is 
responsible for establishing and collecting a fee to cover the costs of 
confinement for every year that an inmate is in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections.131 The amount of the fee collected is the 
average cost of incarcerating an inmate for one year, which is to be 
prorated for people incarcerated for 334 days or less.132 The amount of 
the fee includes “time served prior to conviction” as well.133 The 
Commissioner will also establish and collect this fee for inmates in 
halfway houses and “similar private nonprofit community based 
residential treatment centers.”134 
In assessing whether to impose a fee on a particular inmate, state 
officials gather information from the pre-sentencing investigation report 
 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  
126 Stephey, supra note 121.    
127 S. 2809, 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_I1.PDF.  
128 Assemb. 3964, 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A4000/3964_I1.PDF.  
129 Assemb. 1180, 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A1500/1180_I1.PDF. The bill was reintroduced as it 
was a new legislative session.  
130 S. 579, 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF. 
131 N.J. S. 579(1)(a).  
132 Id. at (1)(b).  
133 Id.  
134 N.J. S. 579.  
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and the findings and orders of the sentencing court.135 This information 
is used to determine the inmate’s assets, liabilities, and dependents.136 If 
the inmate’s financial situation changes from the time of the report, 
[T]he commissioner shall have the discretion to waive the fee or 
impose a lesser fee if the inmate demonstrates to the commissioner’s 
satisfaction: (1) that the inmate is unable to pay the fee and is 
unlikely to become able to pay; or (2) that the imposition of the fee 
would unduly burden the inmate’s dependents.137 
The proposed legislation provides that the fees collected can be 
used towards alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs.138 According 
to State Senator James Beach, “[m]any of those behind bars are there as 
a direct or indirect result of drug abuse, and I believe that the money 
collected could be put to better use to help fund substance abuse 
programs that may help decrease the rate of recidivism.”139 
As the means of collection, the State will have a lien against the 
inmate’s property and income for the amount of the fee.140 Importantly, 
the proposed legislation allows for those people either directly or 
indirectly affected by the lien to bring an action against the State in the 
county in which the lien was filed in order to challenge its validity.141 
Once this process is complete, the entry will have “the same force and 
effect as a civil judgment”142 and the State will have “all the remedies 
and may take all of the proceedings for the collection thereof which 
may be had or taken upon the recovery of a judgment in action, but 
 
135 Id. at (1)(c).  
136 Id.  
137 Id. at (1)(d). 
138 Id. at (1)(e).  
139 James Beach & James W. Holzapfel, Criminals Should Cover the Cost of Their 
Imprisonment, ALLBUSINESS, July 20, 2009, http://www.allbusiness.com/government 
/elections-politics-politics-political-parties/12601658-1.html. 
140 S. 579(2)(a), 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF. In order to establish the lien, the State Treasurer 
or commissioner is to issue a certificate that identifies the person who is indebted to the 
clerk of the Superior Court, and “the clerk shall immediately enter upon the record of 
docketed judgments the name and date of birth of such inmate as debtor; the State as 
creditor; the address of such inmate if shown in the certificate; the amount of the debt so 
certified; a reference to the statute under which the debt is assessed; and the date of making 
such entries.” Id. at (2)(b).  
141 Id. at (2)(f).  
142 Id. at (2)(b). 
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without prejudice to any right to appeal.”143 In addition, post-judgment 
interest may accrue from the date of docketing the certificate, if not 
waived by the State Treasurer.144 Further, if the debt remains unpaid, and 
if the State Treasurer makes further collection efforts, a fee will be 
imposed in the amount of the greater of 20% of the debt or $200.145 In 
order to discharge the lien, the State Treasurer or his agent must file a 
certificate with the clerk of the Superior Court stating that the lien 
should be discharged.146 The State Treasurer is authorized to 
compromise for the settlement of the amount of a lien for the costs of an 
inmate’s confinement.147 
V. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ADDRESS THE BUDGET 
DECREASE AND/OR HIGH INCARCERATION RATE 
A. Jail and Prison Closures 
Several states have considered closing prisons as a means of 
decreasing their expenditures in light of the national recession.148 As of 
2009, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina and Washington had at least considered closing prisons.149 In 
addition, at least twenty-two states have “reduced beds, halted 
expansions, or delayed the opening of new facilities.”150 The ability to 
 
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 The State Treasurer can refer the matter to the Attorney General. Id.   
146 S. 2809(2)(d), 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_I1.PDF. 
147 Id.  
148 John Gramlich, Tracking the Recession: Prison Economics, STATELINE.ORG (June 1, 
2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=403563. 
149 Gramlich, supra note 18. By July 2009, Michigan had closed two prisons and one 
prison camp and has plans to close an additional three prisons and five prison camps in 
fiscal year 2010. New York has plans to close three minimum security prisons and parts of 
seven other facilities. SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 6-7. Since the fall of 2008, 
Washington has closed or has plans to close five units at different facilities. Press Release, 
Dep’t of Corr. Wash. State, DOC Announces Additional Prison Unit Closures and Delayed 
Openings (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.doc.wa.gov/news/pressreleases 
/2009/060209DOCAnnouncesAdditionalPrisonUnitClosuresandDelayedOpenings.asp. In 
2009, New Jersey closed a Camden prison that held more than 1000 prisoners. N.J. To Close 
Camden’s Riverfront State Prison, CBS 3, http://cbs3.com/local/Riverfront.State.Prison. 
2.909382.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).  
150 SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 6-7.  
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take such actions in an effort to reduce corrections expenditures is 
limited to those states that have been able to lower their prison 
populations through policy reforms.151 
In New York, prison closures have been implemented in an attempt 
to decrease the more than $16 million budget gap, which is partially due 
to “staggering revenue losses” following the collapse of Wall Street.152 
With the hopes of saving more than $50 million over the next two fiscal 
years, New York has plans for the complete closure of three minimum-
security correctional camps, and the partial closure of seven additional 
facilities.153 The State will move the inmates expected to be displaced by 
these closures, a total of 670 inmates, to other facilities with open 
beds.154 Because of the potential for job loss, unions representing prison 
employees and the communities in which the facilities are located have 
opposed these closures.155 
B. Reducing Guard to Inmate Ratio 
Another measure taken by some corrections systems to reduce 
expenditures is the reduction of the guard to inmate ratio.156 However, 
this practice is potentially dangerous to both the inmates and the 
 
151 Id. Policy reforms that can work to reduce prison populations include improving 
community supervision, reducing recidivism, and accelerating prison releases. Id. at 7-10.  
152 Gramlich, supra note 148. 
153 SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 6-7, 9. The Sullivan Annex, a minimum security 
prison in upstate New York is one of the closures. Gramlich, supra note 148. New York 
State has closed the following minimum-security correctional facilities: Mt. McGregor 
(Saratoga County), Pharsalia (Chenago County), Gabriels (Franklin County). New York 
State has plans to close the following Annexes: Butler Minimum (Wayne County – 
minimum security), Eastern Annex (Ulster County – medium security), Green Haven Annex 
(Dutchess County – medium security), Groveland Annex (Livingston County – minimum 
security), Lakeview Annex (Chautauqua County – medium security), Sullivan Annex 
(Sullivan County – minimum security), Washington Annex (Washington County - medium 
security). Fact Sheet: 2009 Prison Closures, NEW YORK ST. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES, http://www.docs.state.ny.us/FactSheets/PrisonClosure09.html (last visited Aug. 
29, 2010).  
154 Gramlich, supra note 148. A spokesman for the New York State Department of 
Correctional Services explained, “[w]e are like everybody else. We have to cut back. We 
just don’t have the money…these are different times, and this is a big crisis that we face.” 
Id.  
155 Id.  
156 See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Commentary, It Could Happen to “You”: Pay-To-Stay 
Jail Upgrades, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 60, 60 (2007). 
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remaining guards of the facilities.157 In Los Angeles County, inmates are 
so densely packed in their cells that they must remain in their bunks at 
all times, causing routine assault and rape.158 In 2006, amidst these 
terrible conditions, funding cutbacks led to a reduction in the guard-to-
inmate ratio to approximately one guard per 1000 inmates, as compared 
to the national average of one guard per ten inmates.159 In these dire 
conditions, “overburdened jail administrators and staff may feel there is 
little they can do to prevent the violence.”160 Further, the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons identifies several conditions that 
are likely to result in violence: “overcrowding, idleness, inadequate 
security classification, lack of direct supervision by staff, and a near-
complete absence of recreational activities and rehabilitative 
programs.”161 Although a possible means to reduce expenditures, the 
potential increase in violence may outweigh the utility of this 
expenditure-reduction measure. 
C. Releasing Prisoners 
Several states have responded to overwhelming incarceration rates 
by releasing prisoners early.162 These measures are controversial and 
some believe that early releases, as well as other cost-cutting measures, 
have the potential to threaten public safety.163 Furthermore, when 
released prisoners recidivate, public outrage and reviews of corrections 
policy often result.164 
For instance, in 2008 a paroled Pennsylvania man fatally shot a 
police officer within a month of his release.165 As a result of this crime, 
Governor Ed Rendell “temporarily [halted] the parole process to 
 
157 See generally Matthew Harwood, Prison Overcrowding Jeopardizes Guard and 
Inmate Safety, SECURITY MANAGEMENT (July 21, 2009), http://www.securitymanagement 
.com/news/panel-prison-overcrowding-jeopardizes-guard-and-inmate-safety-005904 
(explaining that overcrowding and reduced guard to inmate ratios increases the level of 
violence experienced by both groups).  
158 Buchanan, supra note 156, at 60. 
159 Id.   
160 Id.  
161 Id. (emphasis added).  
162 Alabama, California, Kentucky, and North Carolina are among the states that have 
released prisoners early in recent years. Gramlich, supra note 18; Gramlich, supra note 20. 
163 Gramlich, supra note 18. 
164 Gramlich, supra note 20. 
165 Id.  
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conduct a ‘top-to-bottom review;’”166 however, the review found that the 
prisoner had been properly released.167 At least eight states in the last 
year have considered or approved the practice of releasing prisoners 
early, and some states, including Alabama and North Carolina, have 
approved the release of elderly or terminally ill inmates, whose health 
care while incarcerated costs taxpayers millions of dollars.168 At least 
thirty-four other states have approved compassionate releases of 
inmates who pose little threat to the public.169 Early release programs are 
highly criticized when it is found that a large number of those released 
commit new crimes. For example, the prisoner release program in 
Kentucky was criticized when it was reported by a newspaper that “at 
least [fourteen] percent of those released were accused of committing 
new crimes within months,” despite the fact that national recidivism 
rates are generally much higher.170 
D. Sentencing Alternatives 
1. Community Courts 
The Community Court system is one measure that New York has 
taken as an alternative to traditional incarceration.171 In 1994, New York 
began the Midtown Community Court in the Manhattan Theater 
District, which focused on “quality-of-life crimes,” such as shoplifting, 
vandalism, and prostitution.172 This innovative program was successful 
and over the past fifteen years, the State has started seven additional 
Community Courts.173 Judge Judith S. Kaye identified three core 
 
166 Id.  
167 Id.   
168 Id.  
169 Id. A compassionate release is the release of an elderly or terminally ill inmate. Id.  
170 Gramlich, supra note 20.  
171 The Honorable Judith S. Kaye, Lecture, Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law and Public 
Service: Shaping State Courts for the New Century: What Chief Judges Can Do, 61 ME. L. 
REV. 355, 361-62 (2009). 
172 Id.   
173 Id. at 362. As of January 1, 2009, there were seven operational Community Courts:  
Midtown Community Justice Center (New York, NY), Harlem Community Justice Center 
(New York, NY), Bronx Community Solutions (Bronx, NY), Red Hook Community Justice 
Center (Brooklyn, NY), Babylon Community Court (Lindenhurst, NY), Hempstead 
Community Court (Hempstead, NY), and Syracuse Community Court (Syracuse, NY). 
Community Courts, NEW YORK ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts 
/problem_solving/cc/courts.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
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elements of the eight Community Courts in New York.174 First, each 
court has “a dedicated judge in the leadership role of judicial 
decisionmaker and convener of all the collaborators necessary to assure 
maximum information and maximum opportunity for a meaningful 
resolution.”175 Next, offenders plead guilty and then receive sentences 
that are “designed to help restore the neighborhood harmed by the 
offense.”176 Finally, in all of the Community Courts, there is additional 
help for offenders, including drug treatment, mental health assistance, 
and interview training and employment services.177 Programs like New 
York’s Community Courts, which sentences offenders to revitalize the 
neighborhoods that they harmed with their illegal behavior, are an 
important way to divert certain offenders from the corrections system. 
This program focuses on rehabilitation, by providing drug, mental 
health, and employment services. 
2. Drug Programs 
Drug courts and substance-abuse programs are important 
rehabilitative programs enabling some inmates to avoid incarceration.178 
Although states must respond to the national recession by decreasing 
their expenditures, programs that seek to rehabilitate offenders should 
not be cut or face reductions in funding, as these programs attempt to 
decrease expenditures related to incarceration.179 Unfortunately, the 
budget crisis has necessitated cuts to substance abuse programs for 
former offenders in New York City.180 
In addition to substance-abuse programs, all fifty states provide the 
opportunity for drug users “to avoid jail time if they meet rigorous 
 
174 Kaye, supra note 171, at 362.  
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 See Gramlich, supra note 20 (explaining that if drug users meet certain standards, 
they may be able to avoid serving time in jail).  
179 Given the economic crisis and the states’ budget problems, C. West Huddleston III, 
executive director of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, fears that drug 
courts will face decreased funding despite their success: “My experience in the last decade 
of working in policy is that, pretty much 100 percent of the time, drug dependent offenders 
are at the end of the line when it comes to funding priorities… It is my fear that in these lean 
times…legislatures [might] see drug court as just an extra expense on the books that they 
can cut to save money.” Gramlich, supra note 20. 
180 Id.  
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sobriety and other conditions set by a judge.”181 These programs are 
successful in reducing the incarceration rate and corrections 
expenditures, as “[m]ore than 70 percent of those who participate in 
drug courts avoid incarceration.”182 Currently, New York has 170 drug 
treatment courts, some of which are in the family courts, offering 
“parents the chance for early reunification with their children if they 
step up to end their drug habit, and offer drug-addicted juvenile 
offenders a chance to get back on course.”183 
3. Sentencing Reform 
Sentencing reform is another alternative that many states have 
implemented as a way to decrease the incarceration rate, and therefore, 
corrections expenditures. Advocates of sentencing reform “support 
curtailing or eliminating mandatory-minimum sentences and want to 
change other policies, such as ‘truth in sentencing,’ that restrict parole 
opportunities for many offenders” in order to prevent the nation’s 
incarceration rate from continuing to rise.184 According to The 
Sentencing Project, which advocates for sentencing law changes as a 
means to reduce incarceration rates, the incarceration rate will continue 
to increase “unless criminal penalties are reduced, even for felons 
serving 20 years or more.”185 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created guidelines to properly 
determine sentences, however, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the 
Guidelines”) established minimum sentences for every federal crime.186 
Since the goal of the Guidelines is “‘objective’ sentencing, the relevant 
criteria were often quantitative, taking minimal account of the 
individuality, background or capability of the defendant.”187 Under the 
Guidelines, sentencing ranges increased if the defendant had a “criminal 
history.”188 The ranges for violations of drug laws resulted in sentences 
that were considerably higher than those prior to the implementation of 
 
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
183 Kaye, supra note 171, at 363.  
184 Gramlich, supra note 20. 
185 Id.   
186 Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Lecture, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s 
Perspective – 2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 15 (2003).  
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
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the Guidelines.189 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and its “truth-in-
sentencing slogan,” limited “the power of the sentencing judge to 
consider many factors personal to the individual, such as family 
responsibilities, military service, education or the lack of it, job 
opportunities, demonstrable remorse or none, mental deficiencies short 
of insanity, and the individual’s capacity for rehabilitation.”190 
In United States v. Booker,191 the Supreme Court held that 
mandatory adherence to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the 
Sixth Amendment, and the Court stated that a defendant has the right to 
have every fact that is relevant to his punishment found by a jury.192 A 
plurality of the Booker Court held the Guidelines to be advisory, and as 
such, opined that reasonableness was the appropriate standard for the 
appellate review of sentences.193 The reduction of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines from mandatory to optional or advisory is an important step 
in decreasing incarceration rates. This allows judges to assess each 
individual offender to determine whether he is a threat to society, and as 
such, must be incarcerated, or whether more intermediate types of 
punishment would be appropriate in the given situation.194 
E. California’s Pay-to-Stay Jails 
Approximately fifteen municipalities in Los Angeles and Orange 
Counties in California have implemented pay-to-stay jails, which 
provide inmates with the option of paying between $75 and $175 per 
night to serve their sentences “in a safer environment, away from the 
chaotic county jails.”195 These jails are run by the municipalities and 
exist in addition to the jails where inmates typically serve their 
sentences.196 This creates a “two-tiered jail system.”197 As a result, 
 
189 Id.  
190 Id. at 16.   
191 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
192 Michelle Reiss Drab, Comment, Constitutional Law: Fact or Factor: The Supreme 
Court Eliminates Sentencing Factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 57 FLA. L. 
REV. 987, 993 (2005); Kathleen H. Morkes, Note, Where Are We Going, Where Did We 
Come From: Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Were Invalidated and the 
Consequences for State Sentencing Schemes, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 249, 250-51, 272 
(2006).  
193 Morkes, supra note 188, at 250-51.  
194 See generally Oberdorfer, Lecture, supra note 182, at 16. 
195 Buchanan, supra note 154, at 60-61.  
196 Buchanan, supra note 156, at 61.  
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inmates must pay in order to be housed in a safer environment.198 These 
programs are virtually marketed to the public.199 Advertisements in 
police stations inform individuals that they can “[s]erve [their] time in 
our clean, safe, secure facility!”200 In addition, “[t]he pay-to stay upgrade 
is pitched to the public as a privilege for basically decent people who 
have run afoul of the law.”201 Although purportedly based on the nature 
of the crime or ability to pay, offenders who are permitted to serve their 
time in pay-to-stay jails have to pass a screening interview.202 
This type of program raises serious concerns about fairness and 
equality, and such concerns may outweigh the program’s utility. Under 
such a scheme, two identical defendants could experience disparately 
different treatment in the criminal justice system based on their ability 
to pay. “Paying to stay is likely not an option for almost 90% of inmates 
in jail, including the 59% of inmates who earned less than $1,000 per 
month before their arrest and the 29% who were unemployed.”203 
Serious fairness and equality concerns are raised, as “there is no 
principled basis on which a low-income drunk driver, drug dealer, or 
batterer ‘deserves to have [his] safety threatened’ in a way his wealthier 
counterpart does not.”204 
VI.  ANALYSIS OF PAY-TO-STAY LEGISLATION IN NEW 
YORK AND NEW JERSEY 
A. New York’s Madoff Bill 
1. Assessment of Madoff Bill 
The Madoff Bill’s provision of a payment schedule creates a strong 
response to the typical criticisms of many pay-to-stay statutes. First, as 
 
197 Id.  
198 Id.  
199 Santa Ana explains on its website that the pay-to-stay jail “is pleased to host a full 
range of alternatives to traditional incarceration.” Robert Weisberg, Commentary, Pay-To-
Stay in California Jails and the Value of Systemic Self-Embarrassment, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 55 (2007).  
200 Id. at 62.  
201 Id.  
202 Id. at 63.  
203 Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon, Commentary, The Dirty Little Secrets About 
Pay-To-Stay, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 67 (2007).  
204 Buchanan, supra note 156, at 66.  
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drafted, this bill meets the concerns of many opponents who argue that 
pay-to-stay programs are not rehabilitative, and that poor inmates will 
not have the funds to pay for the costs of their incarceration. The bill’s 
justification clearly states that the statute is intended to target those with 
the means to pay for the costs of their incarceration, and not every 
inmate of the New York Correctional System.205 It is intended to target 
“well-off criminals” who are able to return to their “opulent lifestyles” 
after their release.206 Although the schedule provides for inmates with 
total assets of $40,000 or greater to be charged for a percentage of the 
cost of their incarceration, and not only those who are extremely 
wealthy, the varied percentages of the fee owed recognize that imposing 
the same fee on all inmates would disproportionately burden those with 
lower incomes. The schedule instead attempts to impose a fair and 
appropriate fee for each inmate by considering the amount of his or her 
total assets in calculating the amount due. 
Second, the Madoff Bill withstands the criticism that pay-to-stay 
programs burden the wrong people. The Madoff Bill authorizes the 
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations in order to 
implement the bill; it does not strictly authorize a deduction from 
inmate accounts.207 If such deductions were to be authorized by the rules 
and regulations, the inmate’s assets would first be assessed in order to 
determine whether they were subject to any deduction at all. Therefore, 
this bill does not burden anyone without a determination that they have 
the ability to pay, as defined by the statute.208 In addition, the fact that 
mortgage payments, homes, home equity, and child support are all 
protected highlight the fact that this bill does not look to burden the 
families of the inmates.209 
Third, in response to the criticism that pay-to-stay fees are difficult 
to collect, the Madoff Bill’s schedule creates a system where fees are 
only imposed when they are likely to be collected.210 This is an 
 
205 Assemb. 09055, 232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A09055%09%09&Memo=Y. 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id.   
209 Id.; Stephey, supra note 121.   
210 This schedule would look to the inmate’s total assets to determine their liability to 
the state Department of Corrections: “[a]n inmate with total assets of two hundred thousand 
dollars or more, one hundred percent of such expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of one 
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extremely important aspect of the bill, as it looks at the obligations and 
financial situation of each individual inmate, rather than imposing the 
same fee on all inmates.211 This would likely prevent the waste of 
administrative costs incurred by seeking to collect from inmates who 
are unable to pay at all, or seeking too high of a fee from inmates who 
could afford to pay only a part of the cost of their incarceration. 
Fourth, the Madoff Bill is pleasing to proponents and taxpayers, as 
it seeks to “hold criminals accountable while taking the fiscal burden 
off. . . taxpayers.”212 This represents an imposition of personal financial 
responsibility on those who can afford to repay the government and 
taxpayers for the cost of their incarceration. Allowing the government 
and the taxpayers to shoulder the burden where the inmate is financially 
able to do so creates an inequitable result. Moreover, the Madoff Bill 
requires payment and is not an optional or alternative program like the 
California pay-to-stay programs. As the Madoff Bill does not reward the 
ability to pay with access to a better correctional facility, this avoids any 
potential equal protection concerns as there may be with the California 
pay-to-stay program, where individuals are able to pay in order to serve 
their time in a safer, cleaner, and less crowded facility. 
The Madoff Bill has the potential to be very successful in New 
York State. The total cost per inmate in New York is over $40,000, the 
third highest in the country.213 Although the total inmate population of 
the New York State Department of Correctional Services declined from 
63,303 on January 1, 2007,214 to 62,598 on January 1, 2008,215 the State 
 
hundred sixty thousand dollars or more but less than two hundred thousand dollars, eighty 
percent of such expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of one hundred twenty thousand 
dollars or more but less than one hundred sixty thousand dollars, sixty percent of such 
expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of eighty thousand dollars or more but less than 
eighty thousand dollars, twenty percent of such expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of 
forty thousand dollars or more but less than one hundred twenty thousand dollars, forty 
percent of such expense,” and finally, “[a]n inmate with total assets of less than forty 
thousand dollars, zero percent of such expense.” N.Y. Assemb. 09055.   
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 Gramlich, supra note 20. 
214 DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., STATE OF N.Y., HUB SYSTEM: PROFILE OF INMATE 
POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 2007 (2007) 10, available at 
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2007/Hub_Report_2007.pdf.  
215 DEP’T OF CORR. SERV., STATE OF N.Y., HUB SYSTEM: PROFILE OF INMATE 
POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 2008 (2008) 10, available at 
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2008/Hub_Report_2008.pdf.  
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still expends a large sum of money on corrections each year. The 
Madoff Bill offers the State the opportunity to collect a significant 
amount from its inmates. Since the number incarcerated is 
approximately 62,000 people, and the annual cost of incarceration per 
person is over $40,000,216 even a relatively modest collection rate would 
yield a significant source of funding that could help to defray the 
corrections expenditures of the State. 
Although New York has already implemented drug courts and 
community courts, it is important to note that the Madoff Bill would 
work best in conjunction with these alternative sentencing programs. 
These programs work to decrease the amount of money that the State 
expends on incarceration by diverting certain inmates from serving time 
in the corrections facilities. For those who are incarcerated, the Madoff 
Bill would provide the State with a means to reduce the budget gap by 
seeking reimbursement from certain inmates.217 Although the Madoff 
Bill would not serve as a prophylactic measure for the budget problem 
in New York, charging inmates for the cost of their incarceration would 
serve as a source of income for the State to offset the budget deficit. 
Further, funds raised under the bill could prevent the State from 
resorting to additional measures in an effort to decrease the budget gap, 
such as reducing the guard-to-inmate ratio.218 Many states are forced to 
cut helpful and rehabilitative programs that are important to preventing 
recidivism. For example, New York City had to end its substance-abuse 
program for former offenders.219 The adoption of the Madoff Bill could 
provide the funding necessary to maintain such rehabilitative programs, 
which help to decrease the incarceration rate. 
2. Suggested Amendments for Madoff Bill 
The Madoff Bill could be amended to provide that in order to file a 
claim, the Attorney General must have good cause to believe that the 
inmate or former inmate has total assets of at least $40,000.. The 
amendment could provide that in the alternative, the Attorney General 
must have good cause to believe that the inmate or former inmate has 
 
216 Gramlich, supra note 20. 
217 New York currently has a $16 million budget gap and has formed plans to either 
fully or partially close several corrections facilities. Gramlich, supra note 148. 
218 Buchanan, supra note 156, at 60 (emphasis added). 
219 Gramlich, supra note 20. 
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the means to reimburse the state at least a certain percentage of the 
amount that they will be assessed to owe.220 Missouri v. Peterson221 
demonstrates the constitutionality of such a provision, as Missouri has a 
provision under the Missouri Inmate Reimbursement Act providing for 
a similar condition precedent to filing an action against the inmate.222 
The addition of this type of provision to the Madoff Bill would prevent 
frivolous filings by the Attorney General where recovery is unlikely. 
Further, like other states, this bill could provide that the state first 
seek to recover from the inmate’s accounts, and then authorize a judicial 
proceeding in order to recover the remaining balance if there is one.223 
This would reduce administrative costs by preventing the State from 
having to file a claim in instances where the inmate’s account has 
sufficient funds to fulfill their obligation to the State, or where the 
difference between the obligation and the amount of money in the 
account would not justify further administrative costs through judicial 
action. 
Finally, the Madoff Bill could be amended to provide for a time 
limit within which the State can seek recovery from former inmates.224 
This would ensure fairness to the inmates by preventing the State from 
having a claim against earnings which are too far removed from the 
time of their incarceration, and do not relate to the former inmate’s 
ability to pay at the time of his incarceration. 
B. New Jersey S. 579 
1. Assessment of S. 579 
The provisions of S. 579 provide a response to many of the typical 
pay-to-stay criticisms. First, the proposed legislation neither burdens the 
wrong people nor harms the rehabilitation of former inmates. In 
addition, it does not attempt to collect fees from inmates who cannot 
afford to reimburse the State. Section (1)(c) provides for an inquiry into 
the individual inmate or former inmate, by looking at his assets, 
 
220 See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009). See also MO. REV. 
STAT. § 217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009). 
221 Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 77 (Mo. 2008). 
222 MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831; Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 80.  
223 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.56 (LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 979a 
(2009).  
224 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009).  
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liabilities, and dependents, as described in the pre-sentencing report.225 
Further, section (1)(d) permits the Commissioner to waive or decrease 
the fee if the inmate can demonstrate that his financial position has 
changed and he is either unable to pay or the fee would “unduly burden 
the inmate’s dependents.”226 The proposed statute reflects the concern 
that individuals who are unable to pay, or for whom the obligation 
might interfere with their rehabilitation, are not burdened. 
Importantly, the statute also looks to ensure that the fines imposed 
on inmates do not affect their dependents too harshly. These elements of 
the statute are significant, as burdening individuals with obligations to 
the State that they cannot reasonably fulfill may function to “force” 
former inmates into criminal activity in order to fulfill their obligations. 
The statute permits “[a]ny person affected in any manner, whether 
directly or indirectly by any lien” to bring an action against the State 
challenging the validity of the lien.227 This allows for either an inmate or 
his dependents to challenge the lien if it is too significant of a burden. 
These provisions work to ensure that only inmates who are able to pay 
either the full cost of their incarceration, or a portion of it, are charged. 
Second, this proposed legislation provides for a thorough, multi-
step collection method, silencing opponents’ criticisms that the fees are 
too difficult to collect. The proposed legislation provides for a lien to be 
entered upon the determination by the Commissioner that a fee should 
be collected.228 Next, if the debt remains unpaid, then the Attorney 
General may take further action, imposing a fee that, “in lieu of the 
actual cost of collection may be [twenty percent] of the debt or $200, 
whichever is greater.”229 This provision will bolster collection efforts 
because it incentivizes payment before the Attorney General becomes 
involved, thereby potentially decreasing the costs of administration.230 
Also, the fact that interest may be charged provides a further incentive 
for former inmates to pay as quickly as possible once the lien has been 
entered against them, and serves to defray the costs of administration.231 
 
225 S. 579(1)(c), 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF. 
226 Id. at (2)(d) (emphasis added).  
227 Id. at (2)(f). 
228 Id. at (2)(a). 
229 Id. at (2)(b). 
230 Id.  
231 S. 579(2)(b), 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at 
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Additionally, S. 579 provides that the funds recovered can be used 
to fund substance abuse programs, due to the relationship between 
substance abuse and crime.232 State Senator Beach has stated that since 
“[m]any of those behind bars are there as a direct or indirect result of 
drug abuse, and I believe that the money collected could be put to better 
use to help fund substance abuse programs that may help decrease the 
rate of recidivism.”233 This is an important provision of the bill, as it 
could potentially prevent the State from being forced to cut 
rehabilitative programs in light of increasing corrections expenditures, 
or from taking other cost-reducing measures discussed above.234 Further, 
costs of incarceration would be indirectly reduced through the substance 
abuse programs, as they target reducing recidivism. 
S. 579 has the potential to raise a significant amount of revenue in 
New Jersey.235 The cost of incarceration per inmate per year in New 
Jersey is over $38,700 per year.236 The total number of residents in New 
Jersey state correctional institutions and satellites totaled 25,436 as of 
January 1, 2009.237 This figure includes 4235 individuals who are in 
youth facilities and 2579 who are in halfway houses.238 S. 579 would 
require those who are in halfway houses to pay for the cost of their 
incarceration, if it is determined that they are financially able.239 
As with New York’s Madoff Bill, due to the high cost of 
incarceration and the large number of people incarcerated within the 
State, even a low or moderate rate of collection would produce a 
significant sum of money that could be used for drug and alcohol 
 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF.   
232 Id. at (1)(e). 
233 Beach & Holzapfel, supra note 139.  
234 See supra Part V.  
235 Based on the average stay per inmate, the Department of Corrections found that “[i]f 
this legislation were enacted, approximately $1,090,488,000 could potentially be generated 
in revenue.” N.J. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL REPORT, S. 2809, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess., available 
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_F1.PDF. The report opines that “only 
a negligible amount” would be collected. Id. Pay-to-stay programs have achieved great 
success in many states in which they are implemented. See supra Part III.A.   
236 N.J. S. 579. 
237 N.J. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS REPORT ON JAN. 1, 2009 (2009) 5, 
available at http://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pdf/offender_statistics/2009/WholeDoc_Off_ 
Char2009.pdf.  
238 Id.  
239 S. 2809, 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_I1.PDF.  
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programs, or possibly to offset high corrections expenditures. 
2. Suggested Amendments for S. 579 
One suggestion for S. 579 is an amendment to provide a payment 
schedule similar to that in the Madoff Bill. This would provide for an 
effective and efficient method for determining the amount of the lien to 
be entered against each individual. A payment schedule that provides 
for different percentages owed depending on the inmate or former 
inmate’s financial status may actually increase recovery and decrease 
administrative costs, as the amounts owed by individuals would be a 
reflection of what could reasonably be obtained from those persons, 
rather than seeking recovery in full or not seeking recovery at all. 
Further, a condition precedent to filing a claim requiring good 
cause to believe that the individual has a certain amount of assets or the 
ability to pay a certain percentage of the cost of his incarceration could 
be included. This would reduce administrative costs by only allowing 
the State to seek reimbursement where it is likely to recover at least a 
significant portion of the inmate’s costs.240 Finally, a provision limiting 
the time within which the Attorney General may file a lien could be 
added to ensure that the amount sought is reasonable in relation to the 
former inmate’s financial position at the time of their incarceration, and 
does not allow the State to have a claim against assets that were 
obtained too far into the future after the inmate’s incarceration.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Both the Madoff Bill in New York, and S. 579 in New Jersey, 
should be adopted. The practice of charging inmates for their 
incarceration, provided that there is an inquiry into their individual 
ability to pay, is an answer to the problem of high rates of incarceration 
paired with declining corrections budgets that faces many states 
currently. Both New York and New Jersey are faced with high costs of 
incarceration; the proposed legislation could defray some of these costs 
while also promoting personal responsibility where an individual has 
sufficient means such that the state should not be faced with shouldering 
the burden of the cost of their incarceration. These programs have the 
 
240 See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009). See also MO. REV. 
STAT. § 217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009). 
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potential to provide a significant source of funds to states, but also must 
be used in conjunction with other alternative methods that seek to 
decrease the rate of incarceration. 
 
